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In this paper I argue that, although Alvin Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy appears on 
only two pages of his recent book Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion 
and Naturalism (2011) (i.e. 58-59), it is of pivotal importance for the book as a whole. 
Plantinga argues that there is superficial conflict but deep concord between science 
and monotheism, and that there is superficial concord but deep conflict between 
science and naturalism. I contend that the weakness of the Felix Culpa theodicy lends 
support to the view that there is more than superficial conflict between science and 
monotheism, and offer an alternative response to the challenge of evil which suggests 
that there might be, after all, concord between science and (religious) naturalism.  
 
1. Plantinga and the challenge of evil 
 
In order to show that, although there is superficial conflict, there is deep concord 
between science and monotheism, central to which is ‘the thought that there is such a 
person as God: a personal agent who has created the world and is all-powerful, all-
knowing, and perfectly good’ (ix), Plantinga argues that God creates by means of the 
process of natural selection (39), that Michael Behe’s writings about irreducible 
complexity constitute a series of ‘design discourses’ for which there aren’t any 
defeaters (258), and that God’s miraculous interventions are not incompatible with an 
interpretation of natural laws as ‘descriptions of the material universe when God is 
not treating what he has made in a special way’ (119). By contrast, Plantinga argues 
that there is superficial concord but deep conflict between science and naturalism, ‘the 
thought that there is no such person as God, or anything like God’ (ix), on the grounds 
that evolution cannot explain why our cognitive faculties are mostly reliable; this can 
be explained only if we have been created in the image of an omniscient God who 
bestows upon us reliable cognitive faculties (chapter 10).  
 
If, however, God creates by means of the process of natural selection, why did God 
choose a process which causes so much suffering to so many sentient creatures? If, as 
Plantinga argues, God was able to preserve populations from perils of various kinds 
(11, 308), why have so many populations suffered so many perils across so many 
thousands of years? Even Behe acknowledges that an argument for an intelligent 
designer is not an argument for the existence of a benevolent God, and admits that the 
designer might just as well be ‘an angel fallen or not; Plato’s demiurge; some mystical 
new-age force; space aliens from Alpha Centauri; time travellers; or some utterly 
unknown intelligent being’ (Behe 2003, 277, quoted in Plantinga 2011, 236). 
Similarly, even if miracles are not incompatible with natural laws and should be 
understood simply as unusual events which God brings about for a purpose, why does 
God not see fit to bring about such events more frequently in order to prevent 
extremes of suffering?  
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Plantinga argues that it was well-known before Darwin that nature is ‘red in tooth and 
claw’ (56) and that animals have suffered throughout the long history of the earth. He 
claims that God permits natural evil and the atrocities perpetrated by human beings 
‘because he has good reason – one that we may not be able to discern – for permitting 
them’ (58). Plantinga also adopts the sceptical theist’s stance in responding to the 
objection of George Ellis that, if God can intervene in order to turn water into wine, 
heal the sick, or raise the dead, why does this happen so rarely? If God is able to 
intervene in order to achieve some good, why doesn’t God intervene to relieve 
suffering of all kinds, from the pain of toothache to the atrocities of Auschwitz? (Ellis 
2000, 383, quoted in Plantinga 2011, 100). Ellis seeks a criterion which would explain 
why God intervenes in some cases but not others, but Plantinga thinks that this asks 
too much; ‘God will intervene … when he has a good reason for doing so; but why 
suppose we human beings would be in a position to know when he does and when he 
doesn’t?’ (101) Likewise, Plantinga suggests that, although the reason for Jesus’ 
resurrection is ‘obvious’ – i.e. it marks Jesus’ special status (106) – in other cases God 
might have had reasons for ‘dealing in two different manners’ with the cosmos (i.e. 
for intervening in some cases but not others), and asks how we could be ‘even 
reasonably sure that he doesn’t’ (107). 
 
Plantinga is, nevertheless, well-known for his version of the freewill defence (e.g., 
1974), in which he suggests what God’s reasons for permitting evil might be, and, in 
Where the Conflict Really Lies and his earlier paper ‘Supralapsarianism, or “O Felix 
Culpa”’ (2004), he develops a bolder response, a theodicy which attempts to 
determine what God’s reasons for permitting evil are.  
 
2. The Felix Culpa theodicy 
 
Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy is described by Kevin Diller as ‘the most 
philosophically nuanced defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy, born out of serious 
theological reflection’ (2008, 88). Plantinga provides an outline of this theodicy in 
Where the Conflict Really Lies. He argues that the best possible world is one in which 
God ‘was willing to undergo enormous suffering in order to redeem creatures who 
had turned their backs on him’ (2011, 58) – i.e. ‘to enable human beings to be 
reconciled to God, and to achieve eternal life’ (59). Any world which contains 
atonement must contain ‘sin and evil and consequent suffering and pain’ (59). If the 
remedy is to be proportionate to the sickness, ‘such a world will contain a great deal 
of sin and a great deal of suffering and pain’ (59), and the sin and suffering may be 
perpetrated and experienced by all creatures. 
 
The detail of the argument may be found in his earlier paper, ‘Supralapsarianism, or 
“O Felix Culpa”’. The theodicy is derived from the debate between two types of 
Calvinism: Supralapsarianism, which holds that God’s decree to save some of the 
fallen precedes the decree to permit sin, and Infralapsarianism, which claims that the 
decree to permit sin precedes the decree to save some of the fallen (2004, 1). 
 
Plantinga argues that God’s aim in creating ‘is to create an extremely good feasible 
world’ (6). Such a world might contain a great deal of creaturely happiness, along 
with ‘beauty, justice, creaturely goodness, performance of duty’ (6-7), and creatures 
who love God and their neighbour as themselves (7). The two most important good-
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making characteristics, however, are the existence of God – although if God exists 
necessarily there cannot be any worlds in which God does not exist – and ‘the 
unthinkably great good of incarnation and atonement’ which ‘towers enormously 
above all the rest of the contingent states of affairs included in our world’ (7). 
Plantinga argues that ‘Jesus Christ, the second person of the divine Trinity, 
incomparably good, holy, and sinless, was willing to empty himself, to take on our 
flesh and become incarnate, and to suffer and die so that we human beings can have 
life and be reconciled to the Father’ (7). This is despite ‘the fact that we have turned 
our back upon God, have rejected him, are sunk in sin, indeed, are inclined to resent 
God and our neighbour’ (7). Plantinga suggests that there is no good-making feature 
of the world which could rival this.  
 
Since God exists in every possible world, and God is good, ‘[a]ll possible worlds are 
very good’ (8); a good God could not have created a world which is not very good. 
Even if God did not create, God would still have existed, and thus the world would 
still have been very good; indeed, Plantinga argues, ‘the value of any state of affairs 
in which God alone exists is itself unlimited’ (9), in the sense that there are no 
nonlogical limits to God’s goodness, love, knowledge and power, and ‘the good of 
God’s existence is incommensurable with creaturely goods’ (9). It is also 
incommensurable with creaturely evils in that, no matter how much evil and suffering 
a world contains, ‘it is vastly outweighed by the goodness of God’ (9).  
 
Nevertheless, some possible worlds are more valuable than others because only some 
possible worlds contain ‘the towering and magnificent good of divine incarnation and 
atonement’ (9). God was not obliged to provide a way in which sinful creatures could 
be reconciled to God, which means that there are possible worlds in which free 
creatures suffer the consequences of their wrong-doing and are cut off from God. But, 
in those worlds which do contain incarnation and atonement, the value of these 
‘cannot be matched by any aggregate of creaturely goods’ (10). And no matter how 
much evil a world contains, ‘the aggregated badness would be outweighed by the 
goodness of incarnation and atonement, outweighed in such a way that the world in 
question is very good’ (10).  
 
Plantinga therefore adopts ‘the strong value assumption’, according to which ‘the 
value of any world which displays incarnation and atonement will exceed that of any 
world without those features’ (11). But all the worlds which contain incarnation and 
atonement also contain sin and suffering because without sin there would be no need 
for salvation, and therefore no atonement – hence the exclamation ‘O Felix Culpa!’ 
(O happy sin!). Thus, the world contains evil because God wanted to actualize one of 
the best possible worlds, and all of these contain atonement, and therefore sin and 
suffering.  
 
Plantinga concludes that Supralapsarianism is right; God’s first intention was to 
actualise an extremely good possible world, but all of these contain incarnation and 
atonement and therefore sin and suffering; thus ‘the decree to provide incarnation and 
atonement and hence salvation is prior to the decree to permit fall into sin’ (12).  
 
Finally, following Pope John Paul II in ‘Salvifici Doloris’ and Paul in Colossians 
1:24, he argues that in suffering we can ‘participate and take part in, can contribute to 
the divine suffering by which humankind is redeemed’ (13). Thus, ‘for a highly 
 4 
eligible world to be actualized, more is needed than just the suffering of Christ’ (13); 
all of these worlds contain atonement and therefore divine suffering, but the goodness 
of a truly good world can be satisfied only by the suffering of both Christ and 
creatures.  
 
3. Objections addressed by Plantinga 
 
In his article, Plantinga addresses the following three objections:  
 
i. Why does God permit suffering as well as sin and evil?  
 
Plantinga argues that God permits moral evil because creatures who are free to do 
both good and evil are more valuable than creatures who are free but have limited 
power. God therefore created a world in which creatures have a great deal of power, 
including the power to work against God, and the freedom to reject God. Thus, free 
creatures cause suffering by opposing God, or as a by-product of the attempt to 
achieve their own ends.  
 
Plantinga also addresses the problem of natural evil, exemplified by the behaviour of 
the Ichneumonid wasp which lays its eggs inside a live caterpillar to enable the pupae 
to eat the caterpillar from the inside. He argues that natural evil is an instance of 
moral evil – i.e. that evil and suffering of this kind may be ‘attributed to the actions of 
Satan and his cohorts’ (16; cf. 2011, 59). He suggests that worlds which contain free, 
powerful creatures who do not sin might be less good than worlds in which they cause 
suffering, because suffering is of instrumental value (17). Some suffering improves 
the character of God’s people and prepares them for life in his kingdom, and some 
suffering may be the price we pay for living in a regular world. Again following Paul 
(II Corinthians 4:10-11, 14, 17; Romans 8), Plantinga argues that suffering also 
contributes towards eternal glory for God’s followers, because sharing in Christ’s 
suffering is, first, ‘a means to attain “the resurrection from the dead”, i.e. salvation’ 
(18), secondly, ‘a means of fellowship with him at a very profound level and a way in 
which [Christians] achieve a certain kind of solidarity with him’ (18), and, thirdly, a 
means by which they come to resemble Christ by displaying the image of God more 
fully (18).  
 
It is, however, questionable whether suffering improves character; one might, 
perhaps, say that it provides an opportunity for improving one’s character, but then 
one might expect an all-powerful and benevolent God to ensure that there is an 
equitable distribution of such opportunities, which is apparently not the case. Even if 
suffering enables resurrection from the dead, solidarity with Christ, and display of the 
image of God, the question regarding the inequitable distribution of suffering – and 
therefore, presumably, of its benefits – remains. Further, if ‘Satan and his cohorts’ are 
permitted to cause natural evil because suffering is of instrumental value, it is difficult 
to understand how this might explain the behaviour of the Ichneumonid wasp. 
Perhaps suffering of this kind is explained as the price which sentient beings must pay 
for living in a regular world, but this raises the question of why God permits so much 
sin and suffering.     
 
ii. Why does God permit so much sin and suffering?  
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Plantinga argues that, since we cannot know whether a world as good as ours has to 
contain as much freedom and thus as much sin and suffering as ours (20), and  
‘suffering is of instrumental value in a variety of ways’ (21), there is no way in which 
we can estimate how much suffering the best possible worlds must contain. He 
suggests that this objection is therefore inconclusive.  
 
iii. Does God suffer from the divine equivalent of Munchausen syndrome by proxy? 
 
Lastly, Plantinga considers whether the Felix Culpa theodicy implies that God suffers 
from ‘a sort of cosmic Munchausen syndrome by proxy’ (21) – i.e. that God requires 
creatures to suffer, without their permission, not for their own good but to enable him 
to achieve his own purposes; he does not behave lovingly towards them, but treats 
them merely as means rather than ends.  
 
Drawing on the work of Marilyn McCord Adams and Eleonore Stump, Plantinga 
argues that God would not require creatures to suffer in order to actualize an 
extremely good world unless the suffering leads to some good for those who suffer 
(23). He notes, however, that at least some suffering appears to be unconnected with 
the good of those who suffer. Here, he suggests that God might allow us to suffer for 
the benefit of others if we freely consent. But, just as human beings must sometimes 
make decisions on behalf of those who are unable to give their consent, so God might 
decide that, if we had been able to make the decision, we would have chosen freely to 
accept suffering which benefits others or enables God to ‘achieve his end of 
actualizing a highly eligible good world’ (24). Even if we are able to make the 
decision and would not accept the suffering, perhaps God knows that our 
unwillingness is due to ignorance of the relevant facts or ‘disordered affections’ since, 
with the relevant knowledge and right affections, we would have accepted the 
suffering (24).   
 
It could, however, be argued that Plantinga has no need to offer an explanation for 
suffering which appears to be unconnected with the good of those who suffer since he 
has already argued, in response to the first objection, that suffering has several 
instrumental functions. The inequitable distribution of suffering and the enormity of 
the price which some must pay are difficulties which remain, however.  
 
4. Further objections to Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy 
 
Two substantial responses to Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy have been offered by 
Kevin Diller (2008) and Marilyn McCord Adams (2008). They consider the following 
objections:   
 
i. Atonement was not necessary 
 
Diller argues that the incarnation is of great-making value not because it enables 
atonement, but because it ‘creates an opportunity for human intimacy and fellowship 
with God which would not otherwise be possible’ (2008: 91). He argues that the New 
Testament ‘seems to advance the notion that, because God became human, believers 
are grafted together in Christ, and enabled thereby to commune with God in a way 
that would not otherwise be possible’ (91). Although suffering may enable us to 
participate in Christ’s suffering, this does not entail ‘that there is a unique quality and 
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value to this kind of intimacy or avenue to intimacy that could not otherwise have 
been achieved, perhaps by the incarnation alone, without suffering and evil’ (91). 
Thus, the incarnation alone could have served as God’s method for ‘drawing us into 
the kind of closer communion with him that transforms us and our relationships’ 
(2008: 91), and incarnation alone is therefore ‘a towering and magnificent act of 
divine condescension and self-giving, incommensurate with creaturely goods and 
evils’ (91), which means that a world containing incarnation but no fall might have 
been just as good as a world containing atonement, evil and suffering (91).  
 
If the purpose of drawing us into closer communion with God is to transform us and 
our relationships, however, this implies that human beings and their relationships 
require transformation – i.e. that they are less than perfect as a consequence of sin. In 
a world with no fall, human beings and their relationships would not require 
transformation. Thus, perhaps incarnation cannot, after all, be separated from 
atonement, and sin and suffering are either prerequisites for incarnation and 
atonement, or, as Plantinga suggests, that which enables incarnation and atonement.  
 
ii. Atonement is not a towering good 
 
Diller argues that Plantinga’s theodicy rests upon the assumption that ‘the enactment 
or display of love that we see in the atonement is a great-making state of affairs’ 
(Diller, 92). But, Diller asks, ‘would the depths of God’s love for creation have been 
any less if sin and evil had not entered the world?’ (92) He acknowledges the 
possibility that ‘the enactment of God’s love in redemption gives us a view of the 
nature of that love which we would not otherwise have had’ (92), but asks how we 
could know the constraints under which God was working while communicating 
knowledge of the nature of divine love.  
 
It is, however, questionable whether Plantinga makes this assumption. Plantinga 
argues not that it is the enactment or display of love in the atonement which is the 
great-making state of affairs, but that it is Christ’s willingness ‘to empty himself, to 
take on our flesh and become incarnate, and to suffer and die so that we human beings 
can have life and be reconciled to the Father’ (7), despite ‘the fact that we have turned 
our back upon God, have rejected him, are sunk in sin, indeed, are inclined to resent 
God and our neighbour’ (7).+     
 
Perhaps Diller is correct, however, in claiming that Plantinga assumes that it is worth 
breaking the relationship between God and creation to enable God’s action to restore 
it (93). Diller acknowledges that in our fallen world it may be true that relationships 
which follow loss and redemption sometimes have a special quality, but, he asks, 
‘[h]ow would we establish the general principle without suggesting, for instance, that 
the strongest marriages are those that have involved a period of divorce, or that the 
deepest mother-daughter relationship is enabled once the daughter commits patricide 
or the like?’ (93)  
 
iii. In a Felix Culpa theodicy, evil is the will of God 
 
Diller points out that, while a free will defence suggests a reason why God might have 
permitted evil, in a Felix Culpa theodicy, ‘evil is made a necessary component of 
achieving a higher good’ (95). God desires evil to emerge so that he can achieve his 
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purposes, and this ‘has a dangerously distorting moral and theological impact. We can 
no longer condemn evil and injustice as wholly antithetical to what is good. Evil is 
ultimately the will of God’ (96).  
 
It might be objected that even the free will defender must argue that God foreknew 
that free creatures would produce evil and so, on this scenario too, evil is ultimately 
the will of God. Thus, the Felix Culpa theodicy is at least no worse in this respect 
than the free will defence.* Diller’s point, however, is that there is a significant 
difference between permitting evil as an unfortunate by-product of the creation of free 
creatures, and creating a world in which evil is necessary for God to achieve his 
purposes. In the first case, evil is something which God cannot prevent; in the second, 
evil is a means to God’s ends. Diller admits that the difference between the two 
positions is minimal but, he suggests, while it is ‘a razor’s breadth’ it has ‘a chasm’s 
depth’ (96). In a free will defence, the permission of evil is essential to the greater 
good, whereas in the Felix Culpa theodicy the evil itself is essential to the greater 
good (96).   
 
iv. A loving God would not require suffering which is of no benefit to the sufferer 
 
Both Diller and Marilyn McCord Adams argue that Plantinga’s theodicy requires 
suffering which is of no obvious benefit to the sufferer. Adams suggests that Kant’s 
maxim that people should be treated not as means but as ends in themselves implies 
that ‘it is not morally permissible to use one another in ways that are degrading or 
depersonalizing’ (2008: 131), and that this applies whether or not a person consents to 
being used in this way. But, even if God knows ‘what an “ideal consenter” with full 
knowledge and perfectly ordered affections would choose’ (130), and is not subject to 
the moral obligation not to treat his creatures as means rather than ends in themselves, 
it is difficult to understand how God could be said to be loving and merciful towards 
the persons that God uses in these ways (131).  
 
In particular, Diller argues, it is difficult to understand how a loving God could permit 
someone ‘to suffer eternally because their suffering is an element in the best world 
God can actualize’ (93). And yet, Adams suggests, Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy 
does seem to require that ‘God calls on individual created persons to be or become 
agents who are not and cannot be pleasing to God according to the criteria published 
by the bible and the Christian religion!’ (133) Despite his claim that creatures with the 
freedom to choose good or evil are more valuable than those who are free but have 
limited or non-existent power, Plantinga’s theodicy ‘has God decide on what careers 
incompatibilist free creatures will have prior in the order of explanation to their 
existence’ (134). But, Adams argues, if ‘God chose for Pharaoh the career in which 
repeated heart-hardenings rain ruin on the land of Egypt; for Judas, the career in 
which he betrays Christ; for the Gospel Pharisees and Sadducees, the careers in which 
they betray their deepest purpose by killing the Messiah Whose way they worked so 
scrupulously to prepare’ (134), in what sense could such ‘wrecked and ruined agency’ 
have had instrumental value for those agents? (134) She suggests that it would not 
have been ‘a sign of disordered affections’ to withhold consent to becoming ‘a God-
hater, a people-hater, a mass murderer, a Christ-betrayer, [or] a God-killer’ (134) and 
that, if this is what God requires of some of his creatures, this seems to imply that 
God hates some of the people God has made (135).  
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Both Diller and Adams note Plantinga’s claim that perhaps God would not permit 
such suffering unless he could use it to bring about some good for the sufferer, but 
argue that Plantinga must require that the good which is brought out of the evil is 
sufficiently valuable ‘to offset the personal toll’ (Diller 94), and must explain how this 
might be achieved (Adams 137-138). Adams suggests that, even if ‘wreck and ruin 
have no instrumental value for wrecked and ruined agents’ (135), God might be able 
to arrange a compensating benefit which would involve healing transformation and 
conversion, but questions whether this would be sufficient ‘to save Divine love and 
mercy to wrecked and ruined agents’ (135). She argues that ‘a God who predestines 
us to be ante-mortem Hitlers or child sex murderers’ (135) in order to create a world 
which contains the towering good of atonement, but tries to compensate us by turning 
us into St Francis or St Clare in the life to come, is no better than the man who beats 
his wife on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, but gives her chocolates and roses on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays (135-136).   
 
It might be objected that God does not predestine some to become ‘agents who are not 
and cannot be pleasing to God according to the criteria published by the bible and the 
Christian religion’, on the grounds that, although God has foreknowledge of 
creatures’ free choices, God does not decide these choices. At best, then, God’s 
decision is only indirect, insofar as he decides to create a world in which he knows 
that free creatures will create evil.+* Adams’ argument, however, is that Plantinga’s 
theodicy requires sin in order to justify the great-making atonement. Thus, even if 
God is not directly responsible for each sin which is committed, if God has created a 
world in which he knows that some agents will perpetrate extremes of evil in order 
that atonement might be justified, there remains a sense in which God is responsible 
for creating ‘wrecked and ruined agents’. Indeed, they are necessary to God’s plan 
since, without them, atonement would not be necessary.    
 
Secondly, it might be objected that, on Plantinga’s theodicy, even ‘wrecked and 
ruined agents’ benefit from atonement, and thus that there is no suffering which is not 
beneficial to the sufferer.* Both Diller and Adams argue that Plantinga’s theodicy 
requires that the good which is brought out of the evil must be sufficient ‘to offset the 
personal toll’, but Adams suggests that no compensation could be sufficient. Here, no 
doubt, Plantinga would simply disagree, but this raises a related objection which we 
will consider in the next section.  
  
v. If only horrendous evils enable incarnation and atonement, would it not have been 
better not to create human beings?  
 
Adams claims that Plantinga ‘shows an insufficient appreciation of the category of 
horrors’ (136) – i.e. ‘evils participating in the doing or suffering of which constitutes 
prima facie reason to believe the participant’s life cannot be a great good to him/her 
on the whole and in the end’ (136). Horrors destroy persons because they ‘threaten to 
swallow up the positive meaning of the participant’s life’ (136). Adams notes that the 
world is full of such horrors, and argues that any credible Christian theodicy must 
address the questions of why God would make us vulnerable to them, and how God 
can be said to be good even when we experience them (see also Adams 1999). 
Plantinga suggests that sin and suffering are instrumentally necessary for God’s 
chosen end, and that human suffering is instrumentally necessary for the sufferer 
him/herself, but Adams argues that ‘horrors do not have instrumental value for the 
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horror participant’ (136). Indeed, she argues, Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy 
‘assigns a meaning to our horrors that deepens the horror participant’s problem by 
explaining that God’s attitude towards him/her is as bad or worse than s/he feared’ 
(136). On Plantinga’s view, horror participants are brought ‘to the verge of despair’ 
since, ‘if I am by nature the kind of person who cannot be benefited without being 
prima facie ruined, then I am a cursed kind of thing indeed’ (136). If God cannot 
prepare us for glory, or enable us to understand the Trinity or enter into  intimate 
fellowship with the divine Persons without ruining us, one might reasonably conclude 
that God is unloving and unmerciful in creating human beings at all (136-137).  
 
5. Adams’ apocalyptic theodicy 
 
Adams recommends, instead, that we seek an answer to the problem of evil in 
apocalyptic theology, in which the faithful endure horrors ‘because heavenly bliss 
awaits them as a reward’. She argues that ‘[t]he suffering has positive meaning 
because it proves the martyr’s loyalty and is recognized and honoured by God’ (137). 
She suggests ‘that what gives positive meaning to horror participants’ lives is that 
God’s primary aim in creation is Divine solidarity with us in a material world such as 
this. Divine identification with us in horror participation (most notably through 
incarnation and crucifixion) weaves up our horror participation into our overall – on 
the whole and in the end – beatific relationship with God’ (137). In this scenario, God 
is not equivalent to the spouse-beater because, even if God’s creation exposes us to 
horrors, God does not ‘directly and deliberately perpetuate individual horrors’ (137). 
Secondly, ‘God shares the cost by exposing Godself to horrors’ (137). Horror 
participation is not ‘a necessary means to beatific intimacy with God’, but ‘going to 
hell and back with God is one shape that an overall beatific intimate relationship with 
God can take’ (137).  
 
It might be argued that this is not so much an alternative to Plantinga’s theodicy as a 
way of fleshing it out.* If the great-making feature of Plantinga’s theodicy is 
atonement, does this not lead to the ‘heavenly bliss’ which Adams deems suitable 
compensation for extremes of suffering?  
 
There are, however, further difficulties. Even if God is not like the spouse-beater who 
‘directly and deliberately’ brings about horrors, perhaps God is like the irresponsible 
parent who leaves his small child alone with an unguarded fire; in such a situation, 
harm is not directly perpetrated but is nonetheless likely. Secondly, if, as Adams 
suggests, the pain of a visit to the dentist in the afternoon is not assuaged by the 
pleasure of a concert in the evening (137), it is not clear that a reward of heavenly 
bliss cancels out pre-mortem extremes of suffering. Thirdly, even if God also suffers 
such horrors, how does this help the horror participant? If I am experiencing 
excruciating toothache, it does not help me to know that you, too, have agonising 
toothache. Indeed, if you, too, are in great pain, you might be less able to help me 
with my suffering. Lastly, we return to the objection that such suffering is inequitable. 
Even if ‘going to hell and back with God’ is just ‘one shape that an overall beatific 
intimate relationship with God can take’, why would a loving God create a situation 
in which only some of his creatures achieve an intimate relationship with God in this 
way? One might respond that God develops an especially intimate relationship with 
creatures who suffer horrors undeservedly as a consequence of other creatures’ free 
choices,* but if it is possible to develop an intimate relationship with God without 
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experiencing horrendous evils, would it not have been better to create a world in 
which every creature has the opportunity to achieve such a relationship without the 
experience of extreme suffering?  
 
6. Plantinga’s sceptical theism 
 
Plantinga concludes his article by claiming that, while the Felix Culpa theodicy ‘does 
not dispel all the perplexity surrounding human suffering and evil’, perhaps, at the 
very least, it ‘reduces the perplexity’ and ‘provides the means for a deeper grasp of 
the salvific meaning of suffering and evil’ (2004, 25). Ultimately, however, in both 
Warranted Christian Belief (2000, 494-498) and Where the Conflict Really Lies, he 
returns to the sceptical theist’s stance. In his article, he refers briefly to the ‘no-see-um 
response’ to the problem of evil. A no-see-um is a very small midge with a very large 
bite. Failure to see a no-see-um does not constitute evidence that it does not exist. 
Likewise, failure to understand God’s reasons for permitting or causing evil does not 
give us grounds for claiming that God does not or could not have a reason (2004, 4, 
note 6). In Where the Conflict Really Lies, he suggests that the reason why it might be 
the case that ‘no theodicy we can think of is wholly satisfying’ (2011, 59) is that ‘our 
knowledge of God’s options in creating the world is a bit limited’, and if God does 
have a good reason for allowing sentient creatures to suffer, ‘why think we would be 
the first to know what it is?’ (59).  
 
For Plantinga, evil does not constitute a defeater for belief in God because it is 
outweighed by the strength of belief in theism. This arises because ‘human beings 
display a natural tendency to believe in God or something very much like God’ (60); 
God has, according to John Calvin, created human beings with a ‘sensus divinitatis’, 
i.e. ‘a natural tendency to form belief in God’ (60). Thus, he suggests, most Christians 
would agree with the Heidelberg Catechism, according to which:  
 
Providence is the almighty and ever present power of God by which he upholds, as with his 
hand, heaven and earth and all creatures, and so rules them that leaf and blade, rain and 
drought, fruitful and lean years, food and drink, health and sickness, prosperity and poverty – 
all things, in fact, come to us not by chance but from his fatherly hand’ (Question 27, quoted 
in Plantinga, 65 and 272).  
 
Plantinga glosses this as: ‘God so governs the world that whatever happens is to be 
thought of as “coming from his fatherly hand”; he either causes or permits whatever 
does in fact happen; none of it is to be thought of as a result of mere chance’ (67). 
Thus, for Plantinga, most Christians believe that sickness and poverty are not the 
unfortunate products of chance but are brought about or permitted by God. He holds 
that God has a good reason for creating the world in this way; we do not know what it 
is, but it is plausible to think that the best possible world is one in which God suffers 
in order that human beings might be reconciled with God and achieve eternal life.  
 
If God does have a reason for causing or permitting evil and suffering which we 
might hope to understand, at least in outline, however, the Felix Culpa theodicy seems 
unsatisfactory. We can only adopt the sceptical theist’s position and claim that we are 
not in a position to judge whether atonement represents sufficient compensation for 
the quantity and intensity of evil* if we accept Plantinga’s claim that there is a sensus 
divinitatis which enables a belief in theism which outweighs the quantity and intensity 
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of evil. But it is not irrational to claim that, even where the sensus divinitatis is 
present, any support for belief in theism which it provides is outweighed by the 
quantity and intensity of evil.  
 
7. The challenge of evil, and religious naturalism 
 
In this section I explore the possibility that the challenge of evil might be met more 
effectively by a form of religious naturalism. Mikael Stenmark identifies three types 
of religious naturalism, which may be distinguished by ascertaining to which of the 
following tenets of religious naturalism they subscribe:  
 
‘RN1: There is nothing beyond or besides nature, and consequently everything that 
exists is part of nature’ (2013, 535). 
‘RN2: There is no personal God or anything like God, nor any non-natural entities 
such as ghosts, spirits, or an immaterial human soul’ (536).  
‘RN3: Religious meaning, value, or significance can be attributed to or found in 
nature or in some aspect of the natural order’ (ibid). 
‘RN4: There neither is nor is not a personal God or anything like this God, because 
what we call God is not a being of some sort but is (completely or almost completely) 
beyond human categories and conceptions’ (537).  
‘RN5: God is the best metaphor or symbol we have to sum up, unify, and represent 
what are taken to be the highest and most indispensable human ideals and values, and 
no other abstract concept such as Nature or the Universe can replace it’ (539.  
 
The three types religious naturalism are:  
 
1. Religious naturalism 1 (accepts RN1, RN2, RN3 and RN5) (541).  
2. Religious naturalism 2 (accepts RN1, RN3, RN4 and RN5) (ibid).  
3. Religious naturalism 3 (accepts RN1, RN2 and RN3) (542).  
 
The first two types are characterised as ‘God-talking religious naturalism’, while the 
third is described as ‘no-God-talking religious naturalism’ (542).  
 
Donald A. Crosby offers a form of religious naturalism which provides a response to 
the challenge of evil. He defines religious naturalism as ‘the view that nature is 
metaphysically ultimate’ (2008, ix), which might be fleshed out in terms of RN1 and 
RN2, ‘and that nature or some aspect of nature is religiously ultimate’ (ix), which 
might be explained in terms of RN3. In Stenmark’s taxonomy, Crosby is therefore a 
religious naturalist of the third type – i.e. a no-God-talking religious naturalist.  
 
Crosby acknowledges that evil is ‘a central, if not the central problem with which all 
religions must wrestle’; indeed, he thinks, it ‘goes a long way toward explaining why 
there is a need for religion in the first place’ (xi). He argues that our capacity to suffer 
is partly a consequence of the fact that we are the outcomes of complex natural 
processes which originated in the remote past. Although nature ‘will eventually bring 
about our own deaths, the deaths of all those we love, and the final dissolution of all 
we have striven to accomplish’ (107), our task is ‘to come to terms with the 
inevitability and finality of death as part of the system of nature as a whole’ (59).  
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Our capacity to suffer is also an unfortunate by-product of the good things which we 
experience. So, for example, ‘[t]he good of being a rock does not require the bad of 
suffering, but the good of being alive and sensate necessarily includes susceptibility to 
it. To be capable of joy is also to be capable of pain’ (28). Many of the goods of 
human life would be impossible without the possibility of suffering. Even ‘[t]he 
pleasure of doing philosophy stems from the extreme difficulty of most of its 
problems and the satisfaction of making some progress, however small, in trying to 
solve them’ (32). Indeed, one might develop this further to argue that most, if not all, 
of the activities of a human life would be unnecessary without evil, defined in its 
broadest sense. There would be no point in sitting an examination without the 
possibility of failure, there would be no need to generate an income if we otherwise 
would not lack food, shelter and warmth, and there would be no need for doctors if 
there were no diseases. Even our leisure activities would be affected; for example, 
there would be no point in watching a film if there were no ‘peril’ to be overcome and 
a happy ending was guaranteed. Thus, without evil, human beings would have 
nothing to do.  
 
Crosby suggests that, even though our encounters with evil can lead to suffering, they 
‘can sometimes be events of grace that give us new insight into the sufferings of the 
world against which our paltry daily frets and worries pale into insignificance. Such 
encounters can reorient our values and motivate us to attend to what we come to 
recognize as important’ (82). Crosby notes that three of Siddhartha Gautama’s 
‘Passing Sights’ were transformative encounters with natural evils – disease, old age, 
and death – and that these led him to begin a religious search which led to his 
enlightenment and Buddhahood (82).  
 
Thus, Crosby argues, our capacity to suffer should not lead us to despair, since his 
religion of nature can help us react to the evils we encounter, both natural and moral, 
in ‘appropriate, constructive, and transformative ways’ (ibid). He claims that faith 
should be construed as the staking of one’s life ‘on something of momentous value 
and importance’ (45); it is ‘a matter of being, not just of believing’ (47). This means 
that we must ‘fight continually to counterbalance the evils with as much good as we 
can help to secure in the world’ (37), and learn to come to terms with the evils over 
which we have no control (106).  
 
Crosby suggests that there are a number of resources on which we can draw. For 
example, we can find in nature ‘the splendour, dynamism, and rejuvenating powers of 
the natural world’ and in ourselves as creatures of nature ‘reliable sources of both 
sustaining and demanding hope, purpose, and value for the living of our lives’ (xi). In 
the battle against moral evil, the sources of our greatest hope ‘are the capacity for and 
impulse toward goodness that lie within each of us’ (111). We may not be 
fundamentally good by nature, but  
 
we have a powerful potential to be good if we can learn to act in accordance with our deep … 
sense of moral obligation, responsibility, and opportunity … Religious faith, including a 
religion of nature, can motivate, encourage, and inspire us to build upon this capacity for and 
tendency toward moral goodness in ourselves and to work together for their actualization and 
incorporation into our institutions and societies (111).  
 
Crosby also recommends spiritual practices such as  
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regular meditation; repentance for past failures and weak resolve; aspiring in one’s heart to do 
good and to find ways to do so effectively; giving fervent thanks for all the good things of the 
world; preparing oneself to be open and responsive to events of grace; searching for strength 
in oneself and in fellowship with others for encounters with systemic and moral evils; 
reaching out to help others – especially humans and nonhuman creatures most in need of our 
assistance and concern – and thereby focusing less intently upon oneself and one’s own needs 
and desires; finding instruction and inspiration in the lives and teachings of exemplary moral 
and religious persons; and participating actively in the collective rituals, traditions, teachings, 
stories, songs, and work of religious communities that are sympathetic with, supportive of, or 
at least not inimical to the outlook of religion of nature (106).  
 
Thus, although Crosby’s religion of nature does not guarantee that good will triumph 
over evil, this does not render our lives meaningless. It means that the future is not 
fixed and therefore needs our efforts and accomplishments, which includes our 
struggles with evil (100). The value of human life is enhanced by our awareness of 
our mortality (10), but personal survival of death no longer matters; it is the 
contributions which we can make before we die to present and future generations of 
living beings which are important (9).  
 
8. Objections to Crosby’s response to the challenge of evil 
 
In this section I consider two objections to Crosby’s religious naturalism and argue 
that they require further modifications of religious naturalism. This, however, leads to 
a version of religious naturalism which might be able to provide a response to the 
challenge of evil which avoids the central difficulty of Plantinga’s Felix Culpa 
theodicy.  
 
i. Crosby fails to offer an adequate response to horrendous evils 
 
Crosby argues that our suffering is partly a consequence of the fact that we are the 
outcomes of complex natural processes and partly a by-product of the good things 
which we experience, and that a religion of nature provides us with resources which 
help us to regard suffering as an opportunity to learn about the sufferings of the world, 
to attend to what is most important, to work to promote good, and to come to terms 
with death. But to what extent does this constitute a better response to the problem of 
horrendous evils than that offered by Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy? Might it not 
be argued that Crosby’s religious naturalism, too, makes an inadequate response to the 
quantity and intensity of suffering? If these features of the world make the existence 
of an omnipotent, good God improbable, do they not also count against the view that 
‘nature or some aspect of nature is religiously ultimate’?* 
 
This criticism might, indeed, be levelled at Crosby’s claim that ‘nature or some aspect 
of nature is religiously ultimate’, but Crosby’s subsequent discussion suggests that it 
might be more accurate to characterise his position as the view that nature determines 
that which is religiously ultimate, and provides us with resources with which to create 
meaning. The question of how we are to identify that which is religiously ultimate is 
by no means insignificant, of course, and there is insufficient space to address it here, 
but this position does at least have the advantage that there is no need to attempt an 
explanation of why an omnipotent and good God made a conscious decision to create 
a world containing so much suffering. On Plantinga’s view, God permitted the Nazis 
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to commit genocide at Auschwitz so that he might create a world in which Jesus 
atoned for their sins, and, as mere creatures, we are unable to claim that the atonement 
was not worth the price of such suffering. On this view, there is a conflict between the 
goodness of God and the reality of suffering which we are ultimately unable to 
resolve. By contrast, on Crosby’s view, suffering is the consequence of evolution, and 
a by-product of the good which we experience. On Crosby’s view, the horror 
participant can draw on the resources which a religion of nature provides, without the 
need to accept that an omnipotent and benevolent God might be ultimately 
responsible for her suffering. 
  
ii. In what sense is religious naturalism religious?   
 
Lastly, one might object to Crosby’s view that, if ‘nature or some aspect of nature is 
religiously ultimate’, to what extent might this be construed as religion? Stenmark 
considers the question of how no-God-talking religious naturalism might be said to 
differ from the position of a non-religious naturalist like Richard Dawkins who is 
known for his ‘reverence and awe of nature’ (543). Stenmark draws on the work of 
Thomas Nagel, from which he appropriates the notion of the ‘religious temperament’. 
He suggests that the religious naturalist is ‘one who thinks there is a naturalistic 
answer, or at least is one who desires such an answer, to the cosmic question: how can 
one bring into one’s individual life a full recognition of one’s relation to the universe 
as a whole? The religious temperament regards a merely human life as insufficient 
and asks for something more encompassing. This is what it means to have a religious 
attitude to life’ (543). By contrast, non-religious naturalists regard the cosmic 
question as meaningless. They ‘feel no yearning for harmony with the cosmos, but 
rather think that the world which the natural and social sciences present is a world to 
which the religious attitude or the religious quest for meaning or sense has no 
application’ (543-544). It is, however, debatable whether Crosby is concerned with 
the question of how one can bring into one’s individual life recognition of one’s 
relation to the universe as a whole, but he does think that recognition of one’s relation 
to the universe as a whole explains suffering and provides us with resources with 
which to address it.  
 
But perhaps it is not, after all, necessary for a no-God-talking religious naturalist to 
dispense with the notion of God. Both versions of God-talking religious naturalism 
identified by Stenmark subscribe to RN5, however, which claims that God is a 
metaphor/symbol for our ideals and values which cannot be replaced by an abstract 
concept such as Nature or the Universe. But perhaps Crosby might be persuaded to 
accept a modified version of RN5, as follows: 
 
RN5b: God is the best metaphor or symbol we have to sum up, unify, and represent 
the highest and most indispensible ideals and values, and the character of these ideals 
and values is determined by Nature and the Universe (which is implied by RN1 and 
RN3). 
 
If, as I suggested in response to objection i., nature is not in itself religiously ultimate, 
but does determine that which is religiously ultimate, God may be conceived of in 
personal terms (and thus the religious naturalist does not need to subscribe to RN2), 
provided it is understood that, given that God is beyond human categories and 
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conceptions (RN4b), divine personhood is a metaphor. Thus a ‘religious naturalism 4’ 
might look something like this:  
 
RN1: There is nothing beyond or besides nature, and consequently everything that 
exists is part of nature. 
RN2b: Where God is conceived of as personal, divine personhood is a metaphor for 
the interaction between the divine and the human, and the importance of relationship.  
RN3: Religious meaning, value, or significance can be attributed to or found in nature 
or in some aspect of the natural order. 
RN4b: God is beyond human categories and conceptions. 
RN5b: God is the best metaphor or symbol we have to sum up, unify, and represent 
the highest and most indispensible ideals and values, and the character of these ideals 
and values is determined by Nature and the Universe (implied by RN1 and RN3).  
 
This, I would suggest, is a version of religious naturalism which is more compatible 
with the claims of monotheism than Crosby’s religious naturalism, but offers a better 
response to the challenge of evil than Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy. Whether or 
not this version of religious naturalism might be regarded as a legitimate 
interpretation of the Abrahamic faiths is, however, a question which space does not 
permit me to address here.  
 
8. Where the conflict really lies 
 
I have argued that Plantinga’s attempts to illustrate a deep concord between science 
and religion lead him to espouse a version of theism which, despite – and, to some 
extent, as a consequence of – the Felix Culpa theodicy, remains vulnerable to the 
problem of evil. Although Plantinga argues that there is a conflict between science 
and non-religious naturalism, I have argued that a version of religious naturalism 
provides one possible response to the challenge of evil. On such a view, we can 
marvel at the beauty of the universe while acknowledging the suffering to which the 
universe also gives rise. God is a metaphor for the highest ideals and values, the 
character of which is determined by nature, which also provides us with resources to 
overcome or come to terms with the challenge of evil. We thereby avoid the 
difficulties associated with belief in an omnipotent and benevolent deity and the 
reality of human and animal suffering – which is where the conflict really lies.  
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